Summary The paper follows the lives of Mateu Orfila and François Magendie in early nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on their common interest in poisons. The first part deals with the striking similarities of their early careers: their medical training, their popular private lectures, and their first publications. The next section explores their experimental work on poisons by analyzing their views on physical and vital forces in living organisms and their ideas about the significance of animal experiments in medicine. The last part (...) describes their contrasting research on the absorption of poisons and the divergences in their approaches, methods, aims, standards of proof, and intended audiences. The analysis highlights the connections between nineteenth-century courtrooms and experimental laboratories, and shows how forensic practice not only prompted animal experimentation but also provided a substantial body of information and new research methods for dealing with major theoretical issues like the absorption of poisons. (shrink)

Summary The paper follows the lives of Mateu Orfila and François Magendie in early nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on their common interest in poisons. The first part deals with the striking similarities of their early careers: their medical training, their popular private lectures, and their first publications. The next section explores their experimental work on poisons by analyzing their views on physical and vital forces in living organisms and their ideas about the significance of animal experiments in medicine. The last part (...) describes their contrasting research on the absorption of poisons and the divergences in their approaches, methods, aims, standards of proof, and intended audiences. The analysis highlights the connections between nineteenth-century courtrooms and experimental laboratories, and shows how forensic practice not only prompted animal experimentation but also provided a substantial body of information and new research methods for dealing with major theoretical issues like the absorption of poisons. (shrink)

Summary The paper follows the lives of Mateu Orfila and François Magendie in early nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on their common interest in poisons. The first part deals with the striking similarities of their early careers: their medical training, their popular private lectures, and their first publications. The next section explores their experimental work on poisons by analyzing their views on physical and vital forces in living organisms and their ideas about the significance of animal experiments in medicine. The last part (...) describes their contrasting research on the absorption of poisons and the divergences in their approaches, methods, aims, standards of proof, and intended audiences. The analysis highlights the connections between nineteenth-century courtrooms and experimental laboratories, and shows how forensic practice not only prompted animal experimentation but also provided a substantial body of information and new research methods for dealing with major theoretical issues like the absorption of poisons. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper analyses the development of three methods for detecting bloodstains during the first half of the nineteenth-century in France. After dealing with the main problems in detecting bloodstains, the paper describes the chemical tests introduced in the mid-1820s. Then the first uses of the microscope in the detection of bloodstains around 1827 are discussed. The most controversial method is then examined, the smell test introduced by Jean-Pierre Barruel in 1829, and the debates which took place in French academies and (...) learned societies during ensuing years are surveyed. Moving to the courtrooms a review is conducted of how the different methods were employed in criminal trials. By reviewing these cases, the main arguments against Barruel's test during the 1830s are explored as well as the changes making possible the return of the microscope to legal medicine around 1840. By reconstructing the history of these three methods, the paper reveals how the senses of smell and vision were employed in order to produce convincing evidence in both academies and courts. The paper questions two linear master narratives that are organized in terms of progress and decline: the development of forensic science as a result of continued technological progress; and the supposed decline of smell in the history of the senses, particularly in the realm of chemistry and medicine. (shrink)

El estudio de algunas oraciones y canciones breves impresas en Italia durante el siglo XVI a la muerte de mujeres de la alta nobleza es una fuente de gran interés para estudiar el lenguaje utilizado para presentarlas como modelos y reducir sus personalidades a concretas características arquetípicas enraizadas en la tradición literaria y filosófica, formuladas en la literatura comportamental para las damas, que se multiplicó a partir de mediados de siglo. En el presente artículo bosquejamos estas características en algunas obras (...) dedicadas a la muerte de tres de las grandes damas de la época en Italia. (shrink)

El artículo examina el papel de Crescas y Spinoza en la transición de la concepción medieval a la concepción moderna del universo. Crescas es presentado como ejemplo ilustrativo de la tensión entre aristotelismo y religión revelada y de cómo esta última provoca la disolución del aquel, allanando así el camino a la concepción moderna del universo. A continuación, se muestra cómo la concepción moderna se plasma en el pensamiento de Spinoza, el cual radicaliza algunos de sus rasgos definitorios. Esta radicalización (...) socava la noción tradicional del _Deus absconditus_ y conduce en Spinoza al remplazo de la religión por la filosofía como auténtica revelación divina. (shrink)

Hegel's main criticisms of Spinoza are well‐known both among Spinoza and Hegel scholars. The role of Spinozism in Hegel's conception of philosophy turns out to be significantly more crucial than the rest of philosophies. This chapter argues that Spinoza's acosmism constitutes for Hegel the necessary condition for the rise and development of philosophy, and hence for the realization of human freedom, insofar as philosophy is the highest form of human freedom. It outlines the general conception of philosophy behind Hegel's statement (...) that Spinozism constitutes “the essential beginning of all philosophizing.” In Hegel's view, the greatness of Spinozism lies precisely in the radical de‐substantialization of finite things that it carries out, that is, in its acosmism.” Spinoza's acosmism clears the ground for the free exercise and unfolding of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Is an epistemological reduction strictly possible? Scientific methodology claims that a boundary separating the system from the “extra-system” can be defi ned. However, no system defi nes its own limits: rather, every system needs extra-systemic presuppositions that are defi ned from outside the system. In this article, we show how various areas of knowledge presuppose the presence of an extra-systemic reality that provides meaning: to know any system, knowledge of the “extra-system” is also necessary.

El articulo examina la aparente discrepancia en el pensamiento de Spinoza entre su teocentrismo epistemológico, según el cual todo es dudoso mientras desconocemos la existencia de Dios, y el principio verum index sui et falsi, según el cual la mera posesión de ideas verdaderas excluye toda incertidumbre. Lejos de contradecirse, estas dos afirmaciones constituyen en Spinoza dos aspectos correlativos del mismo planteamiento gnoseólogico. Se muestra así que la naturaleza divina no es ajena al intelecto humano y que este es capaz (...) de contemplar la realidad desde una perspectiva omnímoda, idéntica a la de Dios. (shrink)

Attempting to escape from the substantialist cartesian dualism, some take our conceptual schemes as dualist. Thus, Feigl makes the distinction between the mental and the physical from an epistemological viewpoint, accepting as distinctive of the mental a direct and immediate knowledge which has no place in the physical, but however he accepts the identity between mental states and neurological states. In a similar way, Davidson, stating that all events are physical, characterizes the mental as a specific manner of describing neurological (...) events, which is also accepted by Quine in his latest books. I take that theory as implying that there are mental properties, like those defined by Searle as macroproperties of the brain. But I see no reason to talk about the mind, unless with the purpose of abbreviating more complex expressions like ‘the set of mental properties’, or perhaps ‘the set of human psychological capacities’, as Kenny proposes. (shrink)

El intento de librarnos del dualismo sustancialista cartesiano conduce a algunos a traspasar el dualismo a nuestros esquemas de conceptualización. Así, Feigl coloca la distinción entre lo físico y lo mental en un nivel epistemológico, aceptando como distintivo de lo mental un conocimiento directo e inmediato que no tiene lugar con respecto a lo físico, aun cuando acepte la identidad entre los estados mentales y los estados cerebrales. De modo parecido, Davidson, manteniendo que todo suceso es físico, caracteriza lo mental (...) como una manera peculiar de describir los estados del cerebro, y es una idea... (Leer más) aceptada también por Quine en sus últimos libros. Me parece que esta explicación obliga a aceptar que haya propiedades mentales, como las que Searle, por ejemplo, define como macropropiedades del cerebro. Pero nada de ello justifica que sigamos hablando de la mente, a menos que sea para abreviar una expresión más compleja como �conjunto de las propiedades mentales�, o tal vez �conjunto de las capacidades psicológicas humanas�, como hace Kenny. (shrink)

The object of the essay is to examine what is basically mental in humans as compared to animals. Differences in respect of the concept of will and in respect of the concept of intellect are examined following ideas expressed by Anthony Kenny in The Metaphysics of Mind, and some criticisms are suggested. Accepting the thesis put forward by Edelman as well as by Damasio that a neurological self is necessary for the development of consciousness, a scientific reading is given to (...) Kant�s idea of the self as well as to that of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. For the same reasons, Wittgenstein�s later rejection of the concept of self is criticized. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta una aproximación lógico-filosófica al problema de las medidas sin interacción (ifm, por sus siglas en inglés) presentes en ciertos experimentos físicos mecánico-cuánticos. Se explicitarán tanto las posibles vías para abordar el estudio de las IFM desde una perspectiva formal, como algunos de los principales retos a la hora de llevar a cabo dicha aproximación.